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Abstract 
Most efforts to detect the consequences of divided government in German federalism 
by analyzing legislative statistics have been unsuccessful. Therefore, there is still much 
debate in Germany about the gridlock potential of divided government, as there is in 
the United States. Using a game-theoretic model, this paper investigates the impact of 
divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main 
conclusion of our model is that a strong opposition dominance in the Bundesrat usu-
ally does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to legislative autolimita-
tion of the government which anticipates the opposition’s veto potential. However, if 
majorities in the Bundesrat are narrow, both government and opposition opt for less 
moderate policy positions, and as a result legislation is characterized by intense party-
political conflict. The hypotheses following from the model are tested on a detailed 
data set comprising all legislative activity in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The 
results confirm the thesis that the main effect of divided government is that it induces 
‘legislative autolimitation’ on the part of the government. We conclude that when 
majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is sub-
stantial. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die politikwissenschaftlichen Bemühungen, das Blockadepotential des deutschen Fö-
deralismus in der Gesetzgebungsstatistik nachzuweisen, blieben bisher weitgehend 
erfolglos. Entsprechend blieb der Einfluss des Bundesrates auf die Gesetzgebung bei 
entgegenlaufenden Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat umstritten. An-
knüpfend an diese Debatte entwickelt dieser Beitrag ein spieltheoretisches Modell, das 
die Auswirkung der Mehrheitsverhältnisse im Bundesrat auf die strategische Interak-
tion von Regierung und Opposition modelliert. Die Hauptaussage des Modells ist, 
dass sich deutlich entgegenlaufende Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat 
im Regelfall nicht in offenem parteipolitischen Konflikt niederschlagen, sondern zu 
gesetzgeberischer Autolimitation führen. Im Gegensatz dazu spekulieren bei knappen 
oder uneindeutigen Mehrheitsverhältnissen im Bundesrat sowohl die Regierung als 
auch die Opposition auf die Durchsetzung von weniger kompromissbereiten Positio-
nen sowie auf eine Abstimmungsniederlage des politischen Gegners, so dass wir hier 
intensiven parteipolitischen Konflikt erwarten. Die sich aus dem Modell ergebenden 
Hypothesen werden mit Hilfe eines detaillierten Datensatzes zur deutschen Gesetzge-
bungstätigkeit zwischen 1976 und 2002 überprüft. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen im We-
sentlichen die Autolimitationsthese des Modells und unterstreichen damit auch das 
erhebliche (latente) Blockadepotential des bundesdeutschen Föderalismus. 
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1 Introduction 
Divided government tends to be associated with gridlock and antagonistic party con-
flict. And this seems perfectly straightforward. In its simplest version the political 
game might be thought of consisting of a right-wing and a left-wing party and a status 
quo point in between. If one party has a majority in parliament while the other con-
trols the second chamber (or, say, holds the presidency), blockage would be the ex-
pected outcome for all policies that require the assent of both, whether it be the first and 
second chambers or parliament and president (Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis/Money 1997). 
However, when we try empirically to identify the legislative consequences of divided 
government, we have a hard time finding much evidence to support these expecta-
tions. Take, for example, Germany, which might be supposed ideally suited for study 
of the consequences of divided government. Since 1970 German governing parties 
have enjoyed a majority in the Bundesrat, Germany’s strong second chamber, in only 
nine out of 34 years. The German Bundesrat is a powerful veto player with strong co-
legislation rights: it holds an absolute veto (see Article 77 of the German Basic Law) 
over almost 60 per cent of all federal legislation, while for the other 40 per cent or so it 
can exercise a suspending veto.1 Moreover, party discipline tends to be high in Ger-
many with the effect that diverging majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat regu-
larly lead to confrontation along partisan-political lines in both chambers 
(Lehmbruch 2000). 
However, statistics on German legislation do not contain much evidence in support of 
the blockage or stalemate thesis. Contrary to expectations, government initiatives 
usually do not fall prey to an opposition veto if majorities in parliament (Bundestag – 
BT) and second chamber (Bundesrat – BR) diverge. The outright failure of a legisla-
tive initiative remains very rare, under both congruent and incongruent majorities. 
Regularly less than three per cent (N < 10 per term) of all initiatives that require BR 
consent fail due to a second-chamber veto; and among such failed initiatives second-
order, ‘petty legislation’ clearly dominates. The opposition almost never vetoes the 
big, important government reform projects in the second chamber, even if it controls 
enough votes to do so (Schindler 1998, section 11.8, 2433–2437). Moreover, there is 
evidence that in the very few cases of veto, ‘blame game’ strategies may have played a 
role – that is, in some of these cases the government may have deliberately provoked 
the opposition’s rejection of its initiative (Groseclose/McCarty 2001). In short, in the 
                                                        
We thank Andreas Broscheid, Henrik Enderlein and Steffen Ganghof for helpful comments. 
1 This suspending veto de facto turns into an absolute veto once a two-thirds BR majority votes 
against an initiative. Parliament’s override would then also require a qualified majority of 
two-thirds of all seats (Article 77, section 4). Within Germany’s PR election system this su-
permajority would only be secured in the event of a ‘grand coalition’ between Social Democ-
rats and Christian Democrats, like the one that ruled between 1966 and 1969. However, a 
two-thirds veto in the BR itself would then be extremely unlikely.  
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German political system the opposition has many veto opportunities, but seems al-
most never to exploit them. This paradoxical finding of a strong veto-potential and a 
lack of clear evidence of its use has led to contradictory assessments of the conse-
quences of divided government. In the German debate, gloomy (Scharpf 1985, 2004; 
Lehmbruch 2000) and sanguine (Benz/Hesse 1985; Sachs 1999; Renzsch 2000) views 
confront one another, and on the basis of the existing empirical evidence there is little 
hope that a reconciliation between the two positions can soon be reached. 
The far richer US literature on the consequences of divided government has also pro-
duced ambiguous findings. In his famous article, Sundquist (1988) associated divided 
government with stalemate, unbroken conflict and political immobility. In his view, 
divided government also renders political accountability problematic – a problem that 
already looms large in American politics. Sundquist’s article has provoked many 
scholarly reactions (Cox/Kernell 1991; Fiorina 2003; Mayhew 1991) in which some of 
the alleged negative consequences of divided government are contested. Mayhew 
(1991), in what is perhaps the most comprehensive challenge to Sundquist’s concerns, 
compared the passage of significant legislation under divided and under unified gov-
ernment and showed that important legislation passes just as often under one as un-
der the other. While some research supports and broadens Mayhew’s findings (Jones 
1994; Krehbiel 1996; Quirk/Nesmith 2000; Jones 2001; Fiorina 2003), others chal-
lenge Mayhew’s conclusion on both theoretical and methodological grounds (Binder 
1999; Coleman 1999; Edwards /Barrett/Peake 1997; Howell, et al. 2000; Kelly 1993). 
A scholarly consensus still seems far away. 
This state of affairs is unsatisfactory and attempts to overcome the impasse would be 
welcome. In our view any such attempt requires both better theory and better data. 
Theoretically, we have to go beyond simple predictions of legislative failure or delay. 
As has been often emphasized in contributions to the debate (Fiorina 2003: 103) our 
main theoretical point of departure must be that political agents – as rational actors – 
anticipate the veto-potential of their adversaries. In light of this basic insight it is after 
all not so surprising that in the German political system divided government has not 
led to a large number of failed legislative initiatives. Empirically, this means that we 
cannot measure veto power directly but have to follow an indirect research strategy. 
In order to detect the effects of divided government – if there are any – we must seek 
empirical regularities in the ‘anticipation of veto’. Central to this pursuit is an insight 
taken from the judicial review literature. Amongst other questions, this literature has 
asked to what extent an opposition’s threat to bring a bill before the constitutional 
court can motivate legislative autolimitation on the part of the government (Stone 
Sweet 1992; Vanberg 1998). Analogously, we might ask to what extent an opposition 
threat to veto a bill in the second chamber might provoke government legislative 
autolimitation. One important insight of the judicial review literature is that if the 
threat is credible – that is, if the constitutional court is ‘active and restrictive’ – a gov-
ernment will accommodate the opposition’s ideal position, thus avoiding any need for 
the court to get involved (Vanberg 1998: 312–313). Applied to our context, this means 
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that if the opposition enjoys a strong majority in the second chamber, a government 
will anticipate the opposition’s veto potential when drafting legislation in order to 
head off any exercise of the second-chamber veto. In other words, instead of looking 
for outright legislative failure or delay, we should seek evidence that divided govern-
ment leads to legislative autolimitation. This is what we propose to do in what follows. 
For this purpose we make use of an exceptionally rich data set that allows us to test 
much more fine-grained hypotheses about the consequences of divided government. 
We analyse a data set containing information on every initiative introduced into the 
German parliament between 1976 and 2002 (N = 5038). For each initiative we have 
information on the duration of legislation, the initiating party, the exact legislative 
procedure, the ministries and committees involved, the voting results, and so on, to-
gether with information on the party composition of the second chamber at every 
important stage of the bill’s legislative passage. To our knowledge, this complete cov-
erage of 30 years of legislative activity in a Western parliamentary system constitutes a 
data set of unparalleled richness and breadth. Compared to previous studies, this data 
set enables us to trace the legislative consequences of any changes in the party com-
plexion of the second chamber in much greater detail. To anticipate the general thrust 
of our empirical findings, they unequivocally confirm the thesis that the absence of 
legislative failure in situations where the opposition enjoys a strong position in the 
second chamber is not due to harmonious policy preferences between government 
and opposition; nor is it the result of the opposition ‘behaving responsibly’. The lack 
of ‘visible veto’ is rather due to the government’s anticipation of the opposition’s veto, 
which in advance forces the government to incorporate the opposition’s ideal stand-
point in its own legislative initiatives – or motivates the government to give up an 
initiative altogether. In other words, we find ourselves in broad agreement with the 
basic finding of the judicial review literature. The importance of divided government, 
like that of judicial review, ‘lies in its indirect, anticipatory effects’ (Vanberg 1998: 300). 
The present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we sketch a simple model of 
the strategic interaction between government and opposition in a bicameral system 
under divided government. From this model we derive a number of – sometimes 
quite counter-intuitive – hypotheses that are open to empirical testing. In Section 3 
we describe our data set and present our evidence. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Autolimitation under divided government 
In a situation of divided government the government does not have a majority in the 
second chamber, and the opposition can threaten to veto a bill in order to extract 
policy concessions. The government’s response will depend on the threat’s credibility. 
If the opposition enjoys a strong position in the second chamber, the government will 
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be willing to compromise in order to secure safe passage of its bill. Governments usu-
ally have an interest in avoiding complete legislative failure because, apart from any-
thing else, failure ‘looks bad’ in front of the electorate, giving the impression that the 
government is unable either to get its preferred policies through or correctly to assess 
what kinds of policy it could get through (Huber 1996; Heller 2001). In other words, 
the government looks either powerless or inept. We assume that legislative failure can 
have – at times very significant – electoral costs.2 By implication, if a government 
would need to sacrifice ‘too much’ of its policy position in order to avoid legislative 
failure it might prefer to refrain from introducing the bill in the first place. However, 
the opposition’s threat is itself not costless. If an opposition threatens to exercise its 
veto, but, when it comes to the crunch, fails to deliver a majority in the second cham-
ber, the opposition may itself pay a significant electoral price. In this case it would be 
the opposition that looked weak and/or incompetent. 
When a government decides to introduce a bill, therefore, it must take the following 
considerations into account. With a moderate bill, the probability of an oppositional 
veto is low, but this comes at the price of a policy that is further away from its own 
ideal point. Whenever the opposition is not in a particularly strong position to exer-
cise its veto, the government might be tempted to weigh the risk of legislative failure 
against the probability of getting a less moderate bill through, plus striking a blow at 
the opposition’s credibility. The opposition, in turn, needs to make the following cal-
culation: a veto threat might motivate the government to compromise and introduce 
a more moderate bill. However, if the government continues with a more robust bill, 
a successful veto would both prevent this policy from being enacted (save the status 
quo point) and, at the same time, damage the government’s political reputation. An 
unsuccessful veto, however, would leave the opposition with a policy less to its liking, 
plus a significant political ‘loss of face’. 
In our view, this stylized account quite accurately captures the basic strategic calcula-
tions of government and opposition within the German political system. Germany’s 
second chamber, the Bundesrat, is composed of representatives of 16 state govern-
ments. These state governments have between three and six seats, depending on 
population size. Votes cannot be split, but have to be cast en bloc. The Bundesrat en-
joys rights of co-legislation on almost all major policy issues. Any federal bill which 
affects the states’ revenue or administration needs the approval of the second chamber 
(Zustimmungsgesetze). Today this applies to almost 60 per cent of all legislation. For 
the other 40 per cent or so (Einspruchsgesetze) the BR can only issue a suspending 
veto, which may be overruled in parliament with an absolute majority (see above). In 
other words, in contrast to the ‘separation of jurisdiction’ federalism of the United 
States or Switzerland, German federalism is characterized by federal responsibilities in 
                                                        
2 In our analysis we do not take ‘blame games’ between government and opposition into ac-
count (Groseclose/McCarty 2001). For more on this point see the discussion below.  
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all major fields of legislation, while at the same time granting states far-reaching rights 
of co-legislation. 
How does this system of joint decision-making (Germany’s so-called ‘cooperative 
federalism’) interact with the party system? With minor exceptions, the parties that 
compete against each other at the national level are also pitted against each other at 
the state level. Moreover, due to the fact that all major legislative responsibilities are 
federal, voters usually do not distinguish between national and regional parties and 
politics (Chhibber/Kollman 2004). Therefore, state elections are often national ‘ba-
rometer elections’ (Anderson / Ward 1996) in which national issues and debates 
strongly influence election outcomes. Federal government parties regularly suffer 
losses in the state elections in almost the same manner as the party of the US president 
loses votes in the mid-term elections to Congress (Burkhart 2004). This ‘midterm loss’ 
gives rise to the frequent ‘divided government’ situations that have characterized 
German politics in the last three decades. Given Germany’s integrated party system, 
with its high degree of party discipline, the voting behaviour of state governments in 
the second chamber has a very strong party-political flavour (Scharpf 1988; Lehm-
bruch 2000), but party conflict in parliament is not simply mirrored in the second 
chamber. At least two important factors intervene: 
– first, state governments may deviate from the party line because of special state 
interests, and federal governments frequently appeal to the specific interests of 
pivotal states in order to form a majority in the Bundesrat; 
– second, due to the PR electoral system coalitions usually govern at both the federal 
and the state level. However, the voting behaviour of the so-called ‘incongruent 
coalitions’ in the second chamber – that is, state coalitions formed of parties 
which at the federal level confront each other as government and opposition – is 
often hard to predict. 
These two factors leave government and opposition in considerable uncertainty about 
the vote cast in the second chamber, which is crucial for the strategic choices of both 
players. We shall now describe these strategic choices more formally. We do so by 
presenting a simplified version of the ‘abstract review’ game in Vanberg (1998). 
The ‘compromise or confrontation’ game that we propose has the following features. 
We assume two actors, a government and an opposition. Both have Euclidian prefer-
ences within a one-dimensional policy space (a policy line). We assume – for the sake 
of simplicity – that the government’s ideal point is located at 0 and the opposition’s 
ideal point is located at 1 with the SQ point in between (0 < SQ < 1), the scenario 
most favourable to the well-known gridlock or stalemate thesis.3 The government 
                                                        
3 We also think that this scenario is the most plausible one in the context of the German party 
system with two dominating left and right parties, the SPD and CDU/CSU.  
10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 04 /11 
makes a proposal p which lies between 0 and the status quo. The opposition can either 
consent to p or threaten to exercise its veto. By assumption, if the opposition con-
sents, the game is over and the outcome is – (p)/– (1– p). The probability of a success-
ful veto in the second chamber is determined by two parameters: first, by the distance 
between p and SQ, which captures the idea that a veto becomes more likely the more 
sharply the proposal deviates from the status quo (cf. Stone Sweet 1992), and second, 
by the ‘unfriendliness’ of the second chamber, captured by the variable b (with b > 0). 
b can mean many things, but primarily – and below empirically – it refers to the po-
litical partisan complexion of the second chamber, in our case the Bundesrat. 
These assumptions have the following implications. The further p is away from SQ, 
the less likely an agreement in the second chamber will be,4 and the greater b is, the 
more likely it is that a legislative initiative will be vetoed. Mathematically, we therefore 
state the probability of a positive vote in the second chamber as a function of its un-
friendliness (measured in b), and of the positions of the proposal p and the Status 
Quo point (SQ) in policy space. The likelihood of passage through the BR is expressed 
with the formula 1 – b (SQ – p). 
However, we also want to capture the politics of the game. We assume that failure – 
either of a legislative initiative or of a veto – usually comes with non-negative electoral 
costs. We therefore follow Vanberg’s model of judicial review by introducing a factor 
of ‘electoral punishment’, c (0 ≤ c ≤ 1). Since electoral competition between govern-
ment and opposition can be described as a zero-sum game, the electoral costs of the 
                                                        
4 We assume that the BR always consents to the status quo (the probability of consent equals 1). 
The probability that the BR will approve p decreases linearly with the distance from the SQ 
and equals 0 for p = s–1/b. 
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one are the electoral gains of the other. Now we are able to draw the extensive game 
form of our simple ‘compromise or confrontation’ game (see Figure 1). 
What is the subgame-perfect solution to this game?5 First, backward induction re-
quires identifying the point in policy space at which the opposition is indifferent be-
tween accepting and rejecting the government’s policy proposal. For the opposition 
the trade-off is the fact that rejection incurs the risk of a failed veto, whereas accep-
tance means that the opposition will have to live with a policy further away from its 
own ideal position (see Appendix 1). We label this point of indifference pˆ . One im-
plication of pˆ is that at a point close to SQ the costs attached to the risk of a failed 
veto outweigh the opposition’s policy sacrifices. In other words, the opposition always 
allows the government some room to manoeuvre – just how much room depends on 
b and c. The more likely a veto is in the BR (the larger b is) or the smaller the electoral 
costs of a failed veto are (the smaller c is), the closer pˆmust be to the status quo 
point. If the government proposes pˆ , the opposition accepts and the game ends. pˆ  is 
always located between 0 and the status quo point. Whether the government pro-
poses pˆ depends on the uncertainty about the voting outcome in the second chamber. 
If b falls below a critical value a government might prefer to propose a less moderate 
policy, p~ , thereby risking an oppositional veto and a confrontational vote in the sec-
ond chamber (see Figure 2). The proposal p~  maximizes expected utility in case of a 
                                                        
5 All mathematical proofs may be found in the Appendix. 
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confrontation with the opposition (see Appendix 2). This strategy is attractive only as 
long as b, the ‘unfriendliness’ of the second chamber, remains below a certain thresh-
old (see Appendix 3). In case of a very adversarial Bundesrat a government will prefer 
to avoid confrontation and to use the – small – policy leeway granted by the opposition. 
The central empirical implication of our argument is obvious. It is not in situations in 
which the opposition enjoys a strong position that we expect gridlock and intense 
inter-party conflict.6 However, we do expect intense party-political conflict under 
narrow majorities where both government and opposition hope to get through their 
uncompromising policy positions and, at the same time, to inflict damage on the 
reputation of their political antagonist. 
Formally, our simple game has the following equilibria. In the case of a very un-
friendly second chamber a government anticipates the political costs of a potential 
veto and compromises its own ideal position until its bill is acceptable to the opposi-
tion (the government proposes pˆ ). However, if the opposition’s majority in the sec-
ond chamber is uncertain, a government may be tempted to introduce a less moderate 
bill at p~ . This will then lead the opposition to reject the proposal and to threaten a 
veto. In such situations both government and opposition bet on a favourable vote in 
the second chamber. The second chamber in turn vetoes the proposal with a probabil-
ity of b(SQ – p). 
Although so far we have discussed only the implications of our model for situations of 
divided government, the underlying logic of our argument has consequences for uni-
fied government as well. Under unified government, the opposition cannot credibly 
threaten a veto and the government succeeds in getting a less moderate bill through 
parliament and the second chamber. However, even here a government will not sim-
ply propose its own ideal point as long as some degree of uncertainty remains con-
cerning voting behaviour in the BR (in terms of the model: as long as b > 0). So even 
under unified government legislative proposals tend to deviate from the government’s 
ideal point and acknowledge the necessity of political compromise with pivotal states. 
Before we turn to our empirical analysis we would like to say a few words about the 
status of our model. Obviously, this model abstracts strongly from ‘real’ legislative 
procedures in the German political system. This is of the very nature of models, how-
ever, and therefore hardly qualifies as an argument against the model: ‘Models are to 
be used, not believed’ (Przeworski 1991: 30). A model becomes problematic only if it 
severely distorts the strategic context in which the central political actors act. In con-
trast, we think that our simple ‘compromise or confrontation’ game quite accurately 
captures the basic calculations of government and opposition in the German political 
                                                        
6 We will spell out in more detail below what we mean empirically by a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ posi-
tion in the BR. 
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system. Two critical points must be addressed in this respect. First, the model does not 
and is not intended to capture the details of mutual compromise, a process that takes 
place in compromise-building institutions like the mediation committee (Vermittlungs-
ausschuss). We are not interested in modelling this process of mutual adjustment, but 
rather in discovering when government and opposition pursue confrontational strate-
gies, and when they act cooperatively – and what policy results we can expect from 
their choice of strategy. Second, we assume that legislative failure (or ‘veto failure’) 
has non-negative electoral costs for the initiating party. We therefore do not consider 
constellations of the ‘blame game’ type (Groseclose/McCarty 2001) in which a gov-
ernment may value the mobilizing effect of an oppositional veto for its own electoral 
constituency. This is not to say that we think these constellations never occur in the 
German political system. However, given the very small number of government initia-
tives that in fact do fail each term, it seems justified to assume that, most of the time, 
German governments want to get their initiatives through parliament and the second 
chamber. 
What hypotheses can we derive from our model? In this respect we would like to em-
phasize the following – at times quite counter-intuitive – implications of our argu-
ment, all open to empirical testing. As already mentioned, we expect strong confron-
tation between government and opposition, not in those situations in which majori-
ties clearly diverge, but where majorities in the second chamber are narrow and con-
tested. As a first testable implication we expect that the number of initiatives on which 
the first chamber produces a confrontational vote should be smaller if the opposition 
enjoys a strong position in the second chamber (H1). 
H1: Under divided government, the share of those initiatives which produce a confrontational 
vote in parliament decreases as the opposition’s representation in the second chamber in-
creases. 
Similarly, our model lets us assume that whenever majorities are narrow in the second 
chamber a government will design its bills in order to win over pivotal states. Under 
these circumstances we are likely to observe more initiatives that are highly confronta-
tional in parliament but which find rapid approval in the second chamber. We there-
fore expect H2 to hold: 
H2: Under divided government, the number of initiatives which are confrontational in par-
liament but are approved in the first round by the second chamber is significantly higher un-
der narrow majorities. 
Related to this is our next hypothesis, which refers to the duration of the legislative 
process. Often, the time lag between initiation and final adoption of a law is inter-
preted as an indication of the deadlock or stalemate potential of divided government 
(see, for example, Cox/Kernell 1991: 243; Bräuninger/König 2000). In light of our 
argument, things might not be so simple. In the case of a narrow majority, a govern-
ment drafts its bill in order to win over pivotal states. If the opposition enjoys a strong 
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position in the second chamber, we expect that the government’s bill will already re-
flect ‘political reality’ and accommodate the opposition’s ideal point. In other words, 
it remains unclear under which constellation legislation can be expected to take 
longer. However, the fact that – according to our argument – we should not be able to 
clearly discriminate between the two scenarios allows us to reject a common view of 
the effects of divided government, namely that legislative duration is a positive func-
tion of the opposition’s strength in the second chamber. Therefore, our third hy-
pothesis (H3) is as follows: 
H3: Legislative duration does not increase with increasing opposition seat share in the second 
chamber. 
One other important implication regarding the duration of the legislative process fol-
lows from our argument, and this applies to all situations in which majorities in the 
second chamber change during the legislative process. If a relevant institutional pa-
rameter like the majority complexion in the second chamber changes, the relevant 
actors have to adjust their legislative strategies. If, for example, the majority situation 
of the second chamber deteriorates for the federal government, we should be able to 
observe that legislation takes considerably longer. This leads us to our final hypothesis 
(H4): 
H4: If the majority situation in the second chamber changes in favour of the opposition after a 
bill has been introduced into parliament, legislation will take substantially longer. 
In Section 3 we test hypotheses 1 to 4 empirically. First, however, we present a short 
description of our dataset. 
3 Empirical evidence 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, we constructed an extensive data set containing all German 
legislative proposals between 1976 and 2002, a total of 5,038 federal bills.7 The data set 
contains comprehensive information on every legislative proposal, including the initi-
ating party, the approval requirements in the second chamber, the ministries and 
committees involved, and – of major importance – the various steps in the passage of 
the legislation. We have information on all major BT and BR votes, in particular on 
                                                        
7 Since 1972, the German Bundestag and Bundesrat have published bibliographical information 
on every federal legislative initiative. Data starting from 1976 can be found on the Internet at 
<http:/ /dip.bundestag.de>. 
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the voting behaviour of government and opposition parties in the Bundestag. Com-
bining these data with information on the party composition of the second chamber 
allows us to closely trace the consequences of divided and unified government for the 
legislative process. 
However, not all 5,038 initiatives in the sample are relevant to our question. First, we 
had to omit all proposals which did not attain a majority in parliament and, as a re-
sult, were not passed on to the Bundesrat. These proposals are almost exclusively bills 
that the opposition introduced into parliament. Given that we are interested in the 
strategic adjustment of the government once it has lost its majority in the second cham-
ber, the exclusion of these failed legislative proposals does not bias our analysis. Sec-
ond, because our model applies only to bills which require the consent of the second 
chamber (Zustimmungsgesetze), we excluded all laws for which the Bundesrat has only 
a suspending veto. Third, a significant share of legislation (18 per cent of all proposals 
between 1976 and 2002) consists of uncontroversial ‘ratification’ bills, most promi-
nent among them the ratification of international (bi- or multilateral) treaties. Such 
bills are routinely accepted unanimously in parliament. In order to avoid these bills 
biasing our results, we excluded them from further analysis. We also had to exclude 
constitutional amendments which require a two-thirds majority, as well as laws on 
which party leaderships declared a free vote, mainly on moral issues, such as abortion. 
This still leaves us with a comfortable 1,038 cases on which to base the following 
analysis. 
In order to test our hypotheses we also need to specify what we mean by narrow or 
uncertain majorities. Given that we can observe only a limited time period, a limited 
number of federal states with a limited incidence of actual coalition changes both at 
the federal and the state level, the party-political composition of the Bundesrat is not a 
continuous variable. Therefore we distinguished three different scenarios (see also 
König/Bräuninger 1998; Schindler 1998). The first scenario corresponds to a classical 
‘unified government’ situation, in which the government parties hold the majority of 
seats in the BR. The second scenario is the reverse situation of ‘divided government’ in 
which the opposition holds more than 50 per cent of BR seats. In both scenarios un-
certainty about the BR vote is comparatively low. 
As already mentioned, Germany’s multiparty system and the frequency of (incongru-
ent) coalition governments between federal and state level often leads to a party-
political composition in the second chamber in which neither the government nor the 
opposition has a majority. It is in these situations that uncertainty about a BR vote is 
highest. Here the pivotal BR actors are the so-called ‘incongruent’ coalitions com-
posed of parties that find themselves in both government and opposition at the fed-
eral level.8 However, not every situation in which neither the government nor the op-
                                                        
8 Usually, coalition agreements foresee that a state shall abstain from voting in the second 
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position enjoys a strong position in the second chamber can qualify as an ‘uncertain 
majority’. Given that the voting procedure in the second chamber requires positive 
votes, the degree of uncertainty depends on the number of state governments that the 
federal government needs to bring into its own camp. The federal government can 
hope to get a bill through the BR only if it needs to win a limited number of ‘swing 
states’. We therefore define our third ‘high uncertainty’ scenario as a situation in 
which a government holds at least 35 per cent of the BR votes (but less than 50 per 
cent) and thus needs to win only an additional 15 per cent of state votes. With a total 
of 69 seats in the second chamber, this is equivalent to winning over two of the 16 
states: a large one with six seats and a medium-sized one with four or five seats. If the 
vote share of the government lies below this threshold – that is, if a government 
needed to convince more than two incongruent or oppositional states – we regard the 
BR majority as a clear opposition majority.9 We now turn to our empirical evidence. 
Results 
According to our first hypothesis we should be able to observe a connection between 
voting behaviour in the Bundestag and the composition of the majority in the 
Bundesrat. More specifically, we expect that under divided government the propor-
tion of controversial laws adopted in the Bundesrat decreases with the strength of the 
opposition in the second chamber. This prediction clearly contradicts common views 
about divided government which often assume a positive relation between opposition 
strength and conflict intensity. With respect to voting behaviour in the Bundestag we 
differentiated between a consensual vote (adopted by unanimous vote, few dissenting 
votes, or opposition abstention) and a contentious vote (adopted against the votes of 
the major opposition party). For 72 legislative proposals accepted by the Bundestag 
(seven per cent of our data), we were not able to establish the precise voting behaviour 
of the opposition in the Bundestag because neither the bibliographical documentation 
of the Bundestag nor the parliamentary protocols had recorded this information. We 
excluded these cases from the test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Our cases are therefore re-
stricted to 966 proposals. 
As can be seen from Table 1, we find intensified party-political confrontation in par-
liament in situations of uncertain majorities in the second chamber. In these situa-
                                                                                                                                                       
chamber if coalition partners disagree about an issue on the agenda. Abstentions count as ne-
gative votes, which would favour the federal opposition. However, coalition agreements are 
not legally binding and numerous breaches of this rule show that on highly politicized ques-
tions contractual agreements alone are not enough to predict state voting behaviour. 
9 Our basic findings do not change substantially, but become slightly weaker if we use the three-
fold classification without the threshold: a government majority in the BR, an opposition ma-
jority, and a neither–nor situation. 
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tions one-third of all proposals that were adopted in the Bundestag were accepted 
against the votes of the opposition. This share is not only clearly higher than in the 
classical divided government scenario (25 per cent), but it is even higher than under 
unified government (28 per cent). Contrary to common perceptions, but in line with 
our argument, strong party-political conflict erupts particularly at times when neither 
the opposition nor the government enjoy a strong position in the Bundesrat. 
Further evidence in support of our argument is provided by a test of H2. Table 2 pre-
sents the voting behaviour in the second chamber for all proposals that were accepted 
against the vote of the major opposition in the Bundestag (N = 270). Again, it be-
comes clear that the common dichotomous view which distinguishes only between 
unified or divided government misses important strategic features of the context in 
which government and opposition operate as rational actors. Table 2 shows that if a 
narrow majority prevails in the second chamber the government has – as we assumed 
in Hypothesis 2 – a bigger chance of rapidly winning approval in the second chamber. 
More than half of all the proposals approved against oppositional votes in the 
Bundestag while an uncertain majority prevailed in the BR are accepted immediately 
by the Bundesrat. In situations of a clear opposition majority, the threat of veto is 
more credible and only about a quarter of the bills rejected by the opposition in par-
liament passes the second chamber in the first round. 
It is often assumed that the length of the legislative process tells us something about 
the blocking potential of the opposition under divided government (see Cox/Kernell 
1991: 243). In contrast we hypothesized in H3 that we should not be able to see a lin-
ear positive relationship between opposition strength in the second chamber and leg-
islative duration. In accordance with our expectations Figure 3 clearly shows a non-
linear relationship between the party complexion of the BR and the time that passes 
Table 1 Proportion of legislative proposals, approved in the BT against the votes of  
 the opposition 
 Government majority Opposition majority Uncertain majority 
Count 80/283 112/450 78/233 
Proportion 0.28 0.25 0.33 
N=966; Pearson Chi-Square=5.6418 (significant at 0.1); Likelihood Ratio=5.5653 (significant at 0.1). 
Table 2 Proportion of legislative proposals, approved by the BR after a negative opposition 
 vote in the BT 
 Government majority Opposition majority Uncertain majority 
Count 74/76 35/123 38/71 
Proportion 0.97 0.28 0.51 
N=270; Pearson Chi-Square=89.7996 (significant at 0.001); Likelihood Ratio=108.6799 (significant at 
0.001). 
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between the introduction of a bill to Parliament and the final vote in the Bundesrat.10 
Surprisingly, law making takes longest in situations of unified government (an average 
of 293 days). The legislative process is about two months shorter when the opposition 
has a strong majority in the second chamber (an average of 250 days). Bills are 
adopted most quickly under an uncertain majority in the second chamber (an average 
of 167 days). 
How can we explain the long decision-making process under unified government? It 
seems that in this case governments invest more time in securing a compromise with 
state governments ‘of the same colour’ in order to avoid open intra-party conflict. 
This apparently prolongs the overall legislative process considerably. Federal–regional 
coordination cannot, on the other hand, take place before the introduction of a legis-
lative proposal because the official legislative initiative serves as a credible political 
commitment by the government to address a certain political issue. To some extent 
our finding might also have a methodological explanation: due to the systematic vote 
losses of government parties in state elections, the average time span of uncertain ma-
jorities between 1972 and 2002 is considerably shorter than the periods of clear oppo-
sition majorities. Consequently, federal laws under narrow majorities could not have 
                                                        
10 We measure legislative duration as the time that elapses between the first introduction of a bill 
into parliament or second chamber and the final vote in the Bundesrat. According to the 
German Basic Law, the federal government, the Bundestag, party factions in the parliament 
and state governments have the right to initiate legislation. 
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been very long because the periods of uncertain majority themselves were temporally 
limited. Therefore, we cannot rule out that a data bias drives part of the result in Fig-
ure 3. 
However, while pure legislative duration remains a problematic indicator of divided 
government’s legislative consequences, our data allow us to trace the effects of changes 
in the majority complexion of the Bundesrat during the legislative process. We ex-
pected that legislation would take longer if the majority in the second chamber shifted 
in favour of the opposition. Our results are presented in Table 3. The first clear mes-
sage of Table 3 is that the number of cases shows the impact of the German midterm 
cycle: federal governments were more frequently confronted by a deterioration of 
their position in the BR (N = 169) than with an improvement (N = 26). If the party-
political weight in the second chamber tilts against the government, we can observe a 
clear impact on legislation duration. In this case, a legislative proposal needs on aver-
age 307 days to get through first and second chamber, 82 days longer than under clear 
divided government. Once again, the effects of divided government are not obvious 
but can be traced if the strategic considerations of political actors are taken into ac-
count. 
 
Table 3 Legislative duration during different majority complexion in the BR 
Legislative duration Majority complexion N 
1,036 
Average  
in days 
Minimum  
in days 
Maximum 
in days 
Standard  
deviation 
Government majority (GM) 264 291 10 1,323 227 
Opposition majority (OM) 396 225  6 1,249 168 
Uncertain majority (UM) 181 159  2 682  96 
Improvement 26 239 57 763 189 
Deterioration  169 307 38 1,221 260 
4 Conclusion 
Does divided government make a difference? Previous studies strongly disagree on 
this point. The main reason for the long-lasting controversy in political science seems 
to be the lack of clear empirical evidence that documents the direct blocking potential 
of divided government. However, looking for direct effects such as the complete fail-
ure or substantial delay of a legislative process might be the wrong approach. We took 
our inspiration from the judicial review literature and suggested that measuring an-
ticipations of a veto is a far more promising research strategy than measuring actual 
vetoes. Specifically, our central expectation was that clearly diverging majorities be-
tween the first and second chamber will not lead to blockage and intense party-political 
conflict because a rational government will foresee the opposition’s veto potential. 
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Rather, it is when neither government nor opposition enjoy a clear majority in the 
Bundesrat that antagonistic party-political conflict is most likely to occur. It is in these 
situations that the government speculates on breaking the opposition’s political resis-
tance in order both to damage its political reputation and to get through a policy that 
is closer to its own ideal point. The opposition, in turn, hopes to veto the govern-
ment’s bill, thereby protecting the status quo and inflicting significant political dam-
age on the government. 
The German political system provides an ideal testing ground for these hypotheses. 
The available evidence strongly suggests that the consequences of divided government 
are indeed mainly indirect and non-linear – most manifest in times of narrow or un-
certain majorities, latent in times of strong opposition control of the second chamber. 
One important implication for further research is that the common simple binary 
distinction between unified and divided government misses important strategic as-
pects of the legislative bargaining process. Such a dichotomous distinction also hides 
the important empirical differences between situations of certain and uncertain ma-
jorities. 
Do our findings for the German case provide insights for other bicameral systems? We 
think they do. Similar to our results, Thorson (1998) found that the frequency of in-
terparty logrolls depends on how strongly divided Congress is, with partisan conflict 
being more likely in situations of uncertain majorities. While the effects in the context 
of the US political system may be less clear-cut given that party discipline is much 
lower than in Germany, basically the same logic should apply. However, we must 
leave it to future research to investigate the logic of ‘legislative autolimitation under 
divided government’ in a political and institutional context different from the Ger-
man one. 
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Appendix 
1 Dominant strategy of the opposition 
The opposition can follow two possible strategies: it can threaten a government’s pol-
icy proposal with a veto or it can abstain from a veto threat. We look for the threshold 
value pˆ , for which the opposition is indifferent between those two strategies. For all 
policy proposals p that lie below pˆ (and hence closer to the ideal point of the govern-
ment), the opposition tries to mobilize a veto in the second chamber. For all policy 
proposals p that lie above pˆ (and hence closer to the ideal point of the opposition), the 
opposition withdraws from a veto threat. 
For the threshold value pˆ , the opposition’s expected gains from the two strategies 
must be the same, hence: 
[1–b(s–p)][p–1–c]+[b(s–p)][s–1+c]=p–1 
(1–bs+bp)(p–1–c)+(bs–bp)(s–1+c)–p+1= 0 
bp2–2bpc–2bps+2bsc+bs2–c=0 
0²2)22(² =++−+− ssc
b
cpcsp
 
with the following solutions: 
bcccsp /² +±+=  
Since p < s, there is only one possible solution pˆ for bcccsp /² +−+= . 
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2 Utility maximization of the government in case of an oppositional  
veto threat 
In case of an oppositional veto, the expected utility of the government is: 
EUG =[1–b(s–p)][–p+c]+[b(s–p)][–s–c] 
EUG =(1–bs+bp)(–p+c)+(bs–bp)(–s–c) 
EUG = –bp
2–p+2bcp+2bsp+c–bs2–2bsc 
Setting the first-order derivation equal to 0 yields the optimal proposal p~ : 
∂(EUG) 
∂p =–2bp–1+2bc+2bs 
 
–2bp–1+2bc+2bs=0 
 
1 p=s+c– 
2b
We refer to this threshold as p~ . It maximizes the government’s utility because: 
∂2(EUG) 
∂p2 =–2b ≤ 0 
 
Manow, Burkhart: Legislative Autolimitation under Divided Government 23 
3 Dominant strategy of the government 
The government prefers the compromise solution pˆ if the expected gains of pˆ exceed 
the expected gains of the confrontation with the opposition at p~ , thus: 
 
 
 
 
Since b > 0, there is only one possible solution for b at 
c
b
2
21+−
>  
Thus, the dominant strategies of the opposition and the government are: 
If 
c
b
2
21+−
>  , the government proposes pˆ and the opposition does not exercise a 
 veto threat. 
If 
c
b
2
21+−
<  , the government proposes p~ and the opposition threatens to veto this 
 proposal. 
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